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The FETUS:
Acorn or Oak Tree?
by S. Timmerman Tepel
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There is perhaps more controversy in
1976 about abortion than ever before.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
spoke to certain issues and plainly decided to ignore others. Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179(1973), (decided the same
day as Roe), did nothing to clarify the
ambiguous quality of Roe. Many people
think there are many unanswered questions remaining from these decisions;
furthermore, there is a large minority
pushing for a constitutional amendment
making all abortions illegal.
The Supreme Court in Roe/Doe
neatly side-stepped a firm answer to the
question: what is a fetus? Is a woman's

biology her destiny? Or, is a fetus an appendix easily removed when it causes
trouble? Hundreds of years of productive thinking by our most brilliant
philosophers hasn't really solved much;
however, the time is fast approaching
when definite answers will be necessary.
Our ability to control our bodies mandates a clear definition of the fetus' status
in the very near future.
I. Before Roe v. Wade
People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458
P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), was
the first reported decision to declare an
abortion statute unconstitutional. Refer-
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ring to Griswold v.Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), the California Supreme
Court concluded that the right to choose
whether to bear children was a woman's
fundamental right based on the right of
privacy or liberty in matters related to
marriage and sex. This case was followed by a district court decision in United States v. VUitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032
(D. D.C. 1969). Vuitch ruled that the
phrase in the District of Columbia's abortion statute referring to the necessity of
danger to the mother's life and health be
eliminated. Then, inBabbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), in
Wisconsin, the district court declared the

statute unconstitutional in respect to an
unquickened fetus; the court cited the
right to privacy.
Next came the district court decisions
of Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217
(N.D. Tex. 1970), and Doe v. Bolton,
319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970),
both cases holding parts of Texas' and
Georgia's statutes unconstitutional.
[The Doe] decision [at the federal district court level, 319 F. Supp. 1048
(N.D. Ga. 1970), did] not stand for the
fundamental right of a woman to
choose whether to bear a child. The
Court made it clear that it was unwilling to declare that such a right reposes
unbounded in anyone individual.
Clearly, the decision to abort a formed
embryo is not purely a private one affecting only husband and wife. The
decision affects not only husband and
wife, but also the state and the fetus as
well. A Survey of the Present Statutory and Case Law on Abortion: The
Contradictions and the Problems,
1972 U ILL. L.F. 177, 187 (hereinafter
cited as Survey on Abortion)
That state courts were not giving free
rein to the concept of the right of privacy,
alluded to in Doe, is even more apparent
in Rosen v. Louisana State Bd. of MedicalExaminers, 318F. Supp. 1217 (E.D.
La. 1970). The Rosen decision emphasized the state's right to assign a
value to fetal life. The court stated: "We
do not recognize the asserted right of a
woman to choose to destroy the embryo
or fetus she carries as being so rooted in
the traditions and collective conscience
so as to be ranked as 'Fundamental'."
Id. at 1232. Other cases, in the period
prior to the Supreme Court's decisions
in Roe and Doe, demonstrate a pattem
of much disagreement and confusion
among the states in their decisions
about abortion.
As evidence of this confusion we find
that-during the pre-Roe periodmany states had abortion laws which
were inconsistent with their feticide statutes. Concerning the effect of liberalized
abortion laws on individual states'
feticide statutes, "[i]t is inconsistent ...
to allow all abortions but to punish a
third-party wrongdoer for an act which
has the same end result-death of the
fetus." Survey on Abortion, supra at
191-92. Two California decisions reflect
this conflict: Keeler v. Superior Court, 2
Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal.

Rptr. 481 (1970), and People v.
Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621,176 P.2d
92 (1947). In Keeler, the district appeals
court first held that a viable fetus is a
human being for the purpose of
Califomia's homicide statutes. See generally The Killing of a Viable Fetus Is
Murder, 30 MD. L. REv. 137 (1970).
This decision was in line with Chevez,
which held that a viable fetus in the act
of being born was a human being.
However, Keeler was overruled, the
decision being based on the fact that
there was no feticide statute, per se, in
California, and therefore, there was no
murder. "Keeler presents the paradoxical situation in which an unborn, 21week child is protected from its own
mother and her doctor but is not protected from a wrongdoer who maliciously takes its life." Knecht, supra at
193.
The controversy which eventually led
up to the Roe/DOle decisions caused as
much comment outside the courts as in.
In 1972, Roger Wertheimer attempted
to give definition to the various trends of
thinking.
According to the liberal, the fetus
should be disposable upon the
mother's request until it is viable;
thereafter, it may be destroyed only to
save the mother's life. To an extreme
liberal the fetus is always like an appendix, and may be destroyed upon
demand anytime before its birth. A
moderate view is that until viability the
fetus should be disposable if it is the
result of felonious intercourse, or if the
mother's or child's physical or mental
health would probably be gravely impaired .... For the extreme conservative, the fetus, once conceived, may
not be destroyed for any reason short
of saving the mother's life.
Since these definitions help not at all
in coming to one conclusion about abortion, Mr. Wertheimer attempts-and
sometimes succeeds~to demonstrate
that all these separate groups are not so
dissimilar as seems apparent at first
glance. He pokes fun at them all, concluding that perhaps the only difference
between birth and viability is the
" ... quite inessential one of geography."
Perhaps the remarks most indicative
of Wertheimer's "conservative's" position came from Pope Paul in 1968.

In conformity with these landmarks in
the human and Christian vision of
marriage, we must once again declare
that the direct interruption of the
generative process already begun,
and, above all, directly willed and procured abortion, even if for therapeutic
reasons, are to be absolutely excluded
as elicit means of regulating birth.
POPE PAUL IV, ENCYCLICAL ON BIRTH
CONTROL 178
Around the same time as the Pope's
"Encyclical", feminists began to be
vocal in their remarks in favor of Wertheimer's "appendix" theory. One aspect
of abortion legislation particularly enraging to feminists was that, at the time of
most statutes' enactment, most legislatures were comprised almost entirely of
men. Many feminists believed that a
man-and certainly not a body of
men-had no right to tell a woman
what she could or could not do to or with
her own body. This has been described
as the double irony: to be punished for
being a woman under a law created in
the absence of women's assent. See
Comment, Isolating the Male Bias
Against Reform of Abortion Legislation
10 SANTA CLARA LA~ER 301 (1970)
(hereinafter cited as Isolating the Male
Bias).
This is the background which brought
us to the Supreme Court's Roe/Doe decisions. The argument for and against
the fetus as person goes round and
round. Perhaps the thrust of the problem
is that logic is of no assistance; the determination of the fetus' status cannot be
grounded wholly in logic. If we find ourselves taking a firm decision on the abortion issue, it's because we are looking at
a fact situation in a certain way-not
because the fact situation is that way. As
Wertheimer so succinctly put it: " ...
there isn't much we can do with a fetus;
either we let it out or we do it in."

II Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
Without Griswold v. Connecticut,
supra, Roe/Doe could not have happened, or, certainly not with such ease.
Griswold held a statute making the use
of contraceptives a criminal offense an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of
privacy of married persons. The Court
found that the Fourteenth Amendment
concept of liberty protects those per-
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sonal rights that are fundamental, and is
not confined to the specific terms of the
Bill of Rights. This concept of the right to
privacy set the stage for the Roe/Doe decisions.
In Roe the Court held that the Texas
abortion statutes prohibiting abortion at
any stage of pregnancy except to save
the life of the mother were unconstitutional. Additionally, it held that during
the first trimester of the pregnancy the
state has no interest in the abortion decision; that at the end of the first trimester
the state may regulate abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to maternal health; and that after viability the
state may regulate and even proscribe
abortion unless necessary for maternal
life or health. One would think that this
decision was flexible enough to please
everyone; on the contrary, it pleased
almost no one. Those who wished for an
absolute right to abortion-trimesters
and viability be damned-were disappointed. Those who hoped that abortion
would be declared absolutely illegal
were disappointed. And, in fact, as we

shall see further on, Roe did nothing to
quell the controversy.
The Supreme Court in Roe made a
thorough historical search of abortion
law before reaching its decision. The
major questions were whether the right
to personal privacy includes an abortion
decision and, inextricably related to that,
whether the fetus is a "person" under
the Constitution. The Court concluded
that the right to privacy does include the
right to have an abortion; but they held
this right to be a qualified one. The Court
stated that this right became limited
when the fetus became "viable".
[I]t is reasonable and appropriate for a
State to decide that at some point in
time another interest, that of the
health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly
involved. The woman's privacy is no
longer sole and any right of privacy
she possesses must be measured accordingly. Roe, supra at 159.
The Court ducked the issue of determining when life begins, stating that viability usually occurs by the twenty-eighth

week, but might occur as early as the
twenty-fourth week. Id. at 160. After
surveying the common law history, the
Court concluded that " ... the unborn
have never been recognized in the law as
persons in the whole sense." Id. at 162.
Discussing the fetus in terms of "potential life", the Court concluded that the
State's legitimate interest arises at viability, when the fetus has the capability of
meaningful life outside its mother's
body.ld. at 163.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting,
stated that "[t]he decision here to break
pregnancy into three distinct terms and
to outline the permissible restrictions the
State may impose in each one, for
example, partakes more of judicial legislation than it does of a determination of
the intent of the drafters of the FourteenthAmendment." Id. at 174. Insome
ways these remarks have evolved into
the words of a prophet of doom; the
Court's division of the pregnancy into
trimesters with the state's interest beginning at "viability" has been the source of
abortion controversy since 1973.

InDoe, decided the same day as Roe,
the Supreme Court reiterated its position
in Roe by declaring that a pregnant
woman has no absolute constitutional
right to abortion on demand. Further,
the Court stated that the Georgia statute
still permitting a physician to perform an
abortion only after-using his best clinical judgment-he determined that the
abortion was necessary was not unconstitutionally vague. "Physician's best
clinical judgment" was defined to include
every factor relevant to his/her patient's
well-being. However, the Court did rule
that the requirement of the Georgia statute that all abortions take place in an
accredited hospital was not reasonably
related to the statute's purpose.
The Court further concluded that a
statute could not require a hospital
committee's approval, nor could it require the concurrence of two other
physicians. And finally, it held that a
state abortion statute could not restrict
abortions within that state to residents of
that state. In Roe, the Court attacked the
general issue of the legality of abortion;
in Doe, it defined the limits of the individual state's permissible involvement.
In respect to the "physician's best
judgment", the Court stated that " ...
the medical judgment may be exercised
in the light of all factors-physical,
emotional, psychological, familial, and
the woman's age-relevant to the
well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health. This allows the
attending physician the room he needs
to make his best medical judgment."
Doe, supra at 192. The Court declared
the hospital requirement invalid because
it failed to exclude the first trimester; Roe
had held that the state had no interest
in an abortion decision during the first
trimester. As to the Georgia statute's requirement of two concurring doctors,
the Court stated that "[ilf a physician is
licensed by the State, he is recognized by
the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. ... ReqUired
acquiescence by co-practitioners ...
unduly infringes on the physician's right
to practice." Id. at 199.
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, added that the Georgia statute's
medical supervision violated the pa-

tient's right of privacy inherent in her
choice of her own physician. This
echoed his remarks in Roe concerning
the right to privacy. "The right of
privacy-the right to care for one's
health and person and to seek out a
physician of one's own choice protected
by the Fourteenth Amendmentbecomes only a matter of theory, not a
reality, when a multiple-physicianapproval system is mandated by the
State." Id. at 219.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in
Roe/Doe is perhaps the most interesting
philosophically. In an attempt to synthesize the thinking of our time toward
abortion, he related his remarks to the
thoughts of many philosophers before
him. He quotes from Mr. Justice Clark:
To say that life is present at conception
is to give recognition to the potential,
rather than the actual. The unfertilized
egg has life, and if fertilized, it takes
on human proportions. ... The
phenomenon of life takes time to develop, and until it is actually present, it
cannot be destroyed. Its interruption
prior to formation would hardly be
homicide, and ... society does not
regard it as such. The rites of Baptism
are not required when a miscarriage
occurs. No prosecutor has ever returned a murder indictment charging
the taking of the life of a fetus. This
would not be the case if the fetus constituted human life. Id. at 217-18,
quoting Clark, Religion, Morality, and
Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal,
2 LOYOLA UL. REV. 1,9-10 (1969)
Justice Douglas' comments seem much
a part of the mainstream of philosophers writing about abortion for the
last fifteen hundred years.
One aspect of Doe of particular interest was that the Court held that physicians had standing to sue, and that they
presented a justiciable controversy. In a
brief Amicus CUriae, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
American Medical Women's Association, American Psychiatric Association,
New York Academy of Medicine, e1. al.
presented their case. Their brief discusses the differences between spontaneous and induced abortion: "The procedure of induced abortion differs from
spontaneous not in the result, nor in the
underlying reason for the abortion, but
primarily in its being conscious and voli-

tional." Brief for Doe as Amicus Curiae
at 13, Doe v. Bolton, supra. The brief
goes on to say that no law requires a patient to seek-or a physician to
provide-treatment to prevent spontaneous abortion. Id. at 14. The physicians' brief concludes: "The trou ble with
abortion statutes is that they reveal an
understandable, but nonetheless substantial ignorance of how medicine is
practiced. As much could be expected if
physicians drafted statutes stipulating
how attorneys should practice law. Attorneys would be required to do 'justice'
to their clients, particularly physicianclients, and failure to do so would result
in ten years' imprisonment." Id. at 56.
The physicians' remarks seem quite
similar to the feminist idea discussed earlier. Isolating the Male Bias, supra. There
the author's argument was that since
women are the ones whose bodies contain the fetus, they are really the
ones-and perhaps the only onesto decide what to do with those fetuses.
In the physicians' brief, the doctors are
arguing that, since they are the ones
called upon to perform abortions,
they-and perhaps only theyshould determine the procedures under
which those abortions are performed.
Certainly Roe/Doe created a violent
upheaval in courts and legislatures all
over the country. However, at first, it
seemed that, at last, there was some firm
ground to stand on when considering
abortion. On the contrary, as the months
have passed since those decisions in
1973, the ground gets mushier and
mushier. Although solving some problems regarding abortion legislation, the
decisions caused many more. Most importantly two "armed camps", mostly
women, began to be publicly vocal.
Neither was pleased with Roe/Doe. On
the one hand were the feminists who felt
they'd been given a placebo: what they
wanted was an absolute right to abortion; what they got was a "qualified
right" . A right so qualified as to be hardly
a right at all. On the other hand were the
"Right to Lifers". They wanted an absolute right for the fetus, Le., the fetus as
"person" from the moment of conception. What they too got was a "qualified
right" for the fetus. And so the fight was
on!

III. After Roe and Doe
A. The Courts
Aside from the dissatisfaction created
in feminists and "right-to-lifers", Roe/
Doe did not bring an end to the abortion
controversy in the courts. There were a
number of unresolved questions remaining.
One problem arose when a layman,
not a physician, challenged the Indiana
statute as unconstitutional. Cheaney v.
Indiana, 410o.S. 991 (1973). There the
Supreme Court denied certiorari for
want of standing of the petitioner. His
argument was that if state legislation required abortions to be performed by
licensed doctors, it would make abortions available only to rich people. The
Court concluded that there was no denial of equal protection. However, the
dissenting opinion in May v. State, 254
Ark. 194, 492 S.W.2d 888 (1973),
maintained that a statute limiting the
grounds for abortion must be uncon-

stitutional as a unit, and that a layman
had standing to challenge the statute as
the statute did not differentiate between
abortions performed by doctors and
those performed by laymen.
In People v. Bricker, 389 Mich. 524,
208 N. W.2d 172 (1973), the court held
that a statute prohibiting abortion unless
necessary to preserve a woman's life was
valid in its application to laymen. However, in State v. Hultgren, 295 Minn.
299,204 N. W.2d 197 (1973), the court
found that since there was no distinction
in the statute between laymen and
physicians, the statute was unenforceable under Roe and Doe. The court did,
however, comment that a statute specifically prohibiting abortions by laymen
would be proper and desirable. In State
v. Strance, 84 N.M. 670, 506 P.2d
1217 (1973), the court held the statute
unconstitutional as applied to abortions
performed by licensed physicians; however, they stated that the statute was

constitutional as applied to laymen.
Another issue that arose after Roe/
Doe was the constitutionality of the
phrase "necessary to preserve her life."
In Nelson v. Planned Parenthood Center of Tucson, Inc., 19 Ariz. App. 142,
505 P.2d 580 (1973), the court held that
there was no unconstitutional vagueness
in that phrase. In respect to that phrase,
the court in Nelson stated that having
that restriction in the statute"necessary to preserve her life" -did
not unconstitutionally discriminate
against poor women for the reason that
wealthy women were presumably free to
travel outside the state. The court also rejected the contention that the inclusion
of that phrase in the statute constituted
an establishment of religion and violated
the plaintiffs' religious liberty. The court
stated that sanctity for life is not only
based on religious concepts.
The abortion case of most Significance
in 1975, and perhaps 1976 as well, isthe

Massachusetts case of Commonwealth
v. Edelin, HUMAN PROD. & THE LAW REP.
I-A-21, at 74-75. In Edelin the prosecution was not based on abortion; rather it
was a manslaughter charge. Dr. Edelin,
by hysterotomy, removed a fetuswhile performing an abortion-from a
woman; the fetus' age was estimated at
from twenty to twenty-eight weeks.
There was much conflicting testimony in
the case, especially concerning whether
the fetus was born alive or whether Dr.
Edelin let the baby boy die by doing
nothing. The Massachusetts statute
concerning abortion had been found
unconstitutional under Roe/Doe, and
the legislature 'had not written a new
one.
Judge McGuire, in his instructions to
the jury, Id. at I-C-132, discussed the
meaning of the word "person", stating
that" ... one ofthe essential elements of
the crime of manslaughter . .. is the
death of a person." Directing the jury as
to how the Constitution uses that word,
Judge McGuire told them that "person"
has " ... applicability only postnatally.
That means after birth. None of the definitions [in the Constitution] indicates
with any assurance that it has any possible prenatal application." Id. Furthermore, Judge McGuire directed that: "A
fetus is not a person, and not the subject
of an indictment for manslaughter. In
order for a person to exist, he or she
must be born." Id. at 133. Despite these
instructions, and the conflicting evidence, the jury found Kenneth Edelin
guilty of manslaughter. The case is currentlybeing considered by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, on appeal.
The Edelin decision set off fireworks.
Calling the trial a "witchhunt", Edelin
said that "a lot of things came together
for the prosecution in my case. They got
a black physician and they got a woman
more than twenty weeks' pregnant and
they got a fetus in the mortuary." It is
clear from Edelin that the decisions
reached in Roe/Doe did not end our
problems with abortion. David M. Alpern stated in Newsweek magazine:
Indeed, the final legal verdict on Edelin may be less important than the
philosophical discussions his case
provides. The adversary system of
the criminal courts is not the place to

define abortion, to define viability, or
to define the moral issues of abortion,'
says Dr. Kenneth J. Ryan ... chief of
staff at the Boston Hospital for
Women.
Interestingly, the legality of Edelin is not
at issue; what has concerned people
writing about the deCision is the ethics/
morality question. Modern science is
complicating the situation daily; the various forms of mid to late term abortion,
with the various accompanying risks of
fetal survival, coupled with improvement in mechanical means of keeping
prematurely "born" fetuses alive, raise
issues of morality and ethics, not issues
that can be decided by the courts.
As Margot Hentoff says: "What determines whether the thing will be
treated as an aborted fetus or a premature infant is whether it is wanted or
not-a rather odd way to make a determination of humanity." She believes
that the " ... real question abortion
raises now and forever ... [is whether]
... killing for utilitarian principles [is]
morally acceptable to humanists and
where should it end?" She argues that
taking the life of the fetus to preserve the
freedom of the mother to be unburdened by a child is merely the "Ethics of
Convenience" . She likens abortions
performed after the first trimester to infanticide: "... we have in modern
western society rejected infanticide as a
solution to social problems." Her final
argument is that the burden should not
be placed upon doctors like Edelin.
Perhaps doctors are the least
equipped to make such judgments.
Their training has educated them to
go against their own early instinctsto cut into flesh, to inflict pain, to mutilate in order to cure. In a way, they are
trained to be less susceptible to things
than the rest of us. To doctors, if the
law says an unborn child is only fetal
tissue, it is fetal tissue. Tell thern to
maintain life in its most tortured form,
and they maintain life.
The issues Ms. Hentoff raises are important ones. It seems that those to decide our stand on abortion need to be
the people, not the courts. This is not to
say that there are not narrow aspects of
the abortion issue that should be left to
the courts. There are a few.
One is the issue of consent, of which

there are two types recurring as a problem in the cases: minor's consent to
abortion, and father's consent to abortion. In respect to the father, the cases
are fairly consistent. There are, however,
two types of paternal consent: that of the
married father and that of the putative
father. Since Roe declared a woman's
"qualified right" to an abortion, where
has that left that father if he wants the
woman to bear the child? In Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1974),
celt. denied, 417 U.S. 279 (1974), the
court found that the statutory requirement of spousal consent was unconstitutional. This decision supported the decision in Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339
(Fla. App. 1973), celt. denied, 415 U.S.
958 (1974). Jones " ... apparently
presented that court with a matter of first
impression in the nation relative to paternal rights of adult unwed fathers in the
abortion decision. The Jones court cited
Roe and Doe in asserting that the essential and underlying factor in its own decision was the maternal right of privacy."
G. Swan. Abortion on Maternal Demand: Paternal Support Liability Implications, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 243, 253-54
(1975). In Jones a putative father was
denied by the court any legal veto over
an abortion; the court declared the right
of privacy to be a personal one.
In Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa.
1975), the court held invalid parts of a
statute requiring consent of a
spouse-or the consent of a parent of a
minor-but they did not reach the issue
of the consent of the putative father. In
Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass.
1974), the court was presented with an
estranged father who testified that he
wanted custody of the child, to support it
and arrange for its care. Despite this, the
court held he had no veto.
In respect to Doe v. Doe, Ms. Lise
Kenworthy remarks that one of the
court's problems is that:
Courts have been reluctant to become
involved in marital relations and protect one spouse from the act of the
other. . .. More specifically, assuming that the husband has an interest
which is entitled to judicial protection,
the prospect of ordering a woman not
to procure an abortion involves seri-

ous enforcement problems and provokes the question of how one would
punish a woman if she disobeyed the
decree.
In this case the court reasoned that
since the state could not regulate the
abortion decision before the fetus becomes viable, then the state could not
come to the aid of the husband with authority it did not possess. Doe v. Doe,
supra at 132.
The Supreme Court finally reached
the issue of consent-both spousal and
parental-in Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct.
2831 (1976). In Planned Parenthood,
Justice Blackmun's opinion, expressing
the Court's unanimous view, held that
the spousal consent provision in a Missouri statute was unconstitutional. The
reasoning was based on the fact that
since the state could not regulate or
proscribe abortions in the first trimester,
then the state could not delegate to a
spouse an authority it did not have itself.
Unfortunately, the issue of the consent
of the putative father was not before the
court; however, it does seem likely that if
the Supreme Court does not grant the
privilege of consent to a spouse, then the
consent privilege would not be granted
to the unmarried father.
Doe v. Doe raised a question in respect to the father's liability for support.
Judith Zernich suggests that "Doe has
produced the anomalous situation of
granting the woman's physician substantive rights superior to those of the
father." Yet, if the woman chooses not
to have the abortion, the father has the
duty to support that child. The stand
taken in Doe seems difficult; a father requesting custody and offering support is
refused his right to make the mother
bear his child, yet had she chosen to bear
it, he would have had to support it. Ms.
Zernich argues that " ... if the father is
willing to assume custody and support,
and if the conception had been a desired
one, perhaps requiring a full-term pregnancy is justified." She concludes by
acknowledging that the obstacles in solving this problem are formidable, but not
sufficiently formidable to totally ignore
the father's rights. Elimination of paternalliability for child support may be logically and equitably necessary; or, alter-

natively, recognition of the paternal veto
may be the answer. Swan, supra at 272.
A minor's right to an abortion without
her parent's consent has frequently been
a problem to the courts. Mr. Fred Hiatt
would argue that since " ... permission
from a minor's parent is routinely accepted as informed consent ... " today
(in respect to experimentation on the
child as subject), the child ought to have
the right to control the abortion decision.
The courts since Roe/Doe mostly agree.
In State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901,
530 P.2d 260 (1975), the Washington
Supreme Court invalidated that state's
consent statute. The court found that the
statute too broadly encumbered the
unmarried woman's right to abortion,
and that it discriminated between similarly situated groups of women. The
lower court's decision turned on informed consent. The Rorida court in

Coe v. Gerstein, supra, held that " ... a
pregnant woman under 18 years of age
cannot, under the law, be distinguished
from one over 18 years of age in reference to 'fundamental,' 'personal' constitutional rights." at 698. Most courts
agree. "Data indicates that fear of parental reactions may drive the pregnant
minor to run away from home, seek
criminal abortion, attempt self-abortion,
or even suicide. An absolute parental
consent requirement would often result
in denial or detrimental delay of needed
medical care. Thus parental consent requirements are likely to be counterproductive. Furthermore, for reasons of
health and social policy, it is not constructive to allow the imposition of compulsory pregnancy as punishment by
parents. As the Koome court reasoned,
" ... parental prerogatives ... are not
absolute and must yield to fundamental

rights of the child or important interests
of the State ... and the State's interest in
restricting minors' access to abortions
[is] inadequate to satisfy the requirements of due process under Roe and
Doe." 530 P.2d at 264.
The Supreme Court agrees. The recently decided Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, held
the statute's parental consent provision
unconstitutional since the state did not
have the constitutional authority to give
a third party an absolute, possibly
arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient.
B. The People
Most of the post Roe/Doe furor is not
taking place in the courts; more people
with no real legal orientation are writing,
thinking-and shouting-about abortion than ever before. Until recently, the
practice of abortion was not taboo, only
the mention of it. Now that the practice is
neither taboo nor illegal, the mention of
it is no longer taboo. Is the wish to be rid
of "Eve's burden" -abortion-a
needed instrument of social policy? Despite Roe/Doe, the people do not agree.
If we accept the underlying dictum of
medical ethics as "Do no harm", is there
a way out of the abortion dilemma by
doing no harm? Or are we searching
merely for a way to do the least
harm-to the woman, to the father, to
the parents of a minor, and to the fetus?

Do we look at the fetus' right to live as
primary, or do we consider the effect of
that life on others as primary? Anthony
Smith, in The Human Pedigree
suggests: "With the courts, and plaintiffs
and defendants, and hard cash and publicity all involved, the fetus is joining the
society of which it is a part earlier than
ever before." The speculation is endless.
What about fetal research? Since an
aborted fetus prior to viability-at
least-is not a "person," is that fetus
then fair game for research? What about
the future of our human race? Does man
have an obligation to weed out, through
genetic counseling, the imperfect
fetuses? Smith states:
We lavish intense care upon our infants the moment they are born but
have not expended thought upon the
manner of their conception. There is a
hidebound quality in our attitude that
the genetic lottery of who mates with
whom should be preserved at all
costs .... If a third of our mental institution inmates are mongoloids, is it
not strange that we do nothing to lessen that intake?
What about amniocentesis, a method
by which a small amount of amniotic
fluid is extracted in the twelfth to sixteenth week of pregnancy? This procedure is not new; it has been used for
years to determine Rh factor incompatibility between mother and fetus. It may
involve fetal puncture, or it may induce
abortion and fetal malformation; it may
photo by June Chaplin

cause infection and bleeding to the
mother. Do we follow Margot Hentoff's
"Ethics of Convenience"? One doctor
has said: "The final arbiter of what children should be born is the parents themselves. Only they know what is best for
their marriage. I don't have any hesitation in cooperating with an abortion if
both parents want only girls and the current pregnancy tests out by amniocentesis to be a boy." Mr. Richard Restak
believes that doctors like this one see
parents as consumers. Is the real point of
the whole argument that a fetus is a part
of a woman's body until it is born?
"Anti-abortion laws give fetuses rights
that living people don't enjoy. No human's right to life includes the use of
another human being's body and lifesupport systems against that individual's
will," says Jimmye Kimmey.
The Edelin decision has already
slowed down fetal research. And yet research on fetuses has precipitated many
benefits for our society. Fetal research
cannot be divorced from the abortion
issue because the fundamental question
is the same: is the fetus human? Either
the fetus is human or it's not. If the courts
decree the pre-viable fetus non-human
for abortions, then it should be nonhuman for research purposes. A number
of states have adopted statutes which
limitfetal research. In July of 1974, Public Law 93-348, Title II - Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, established a National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.
In May of 1975 the Commission issued a comprehensive report on the use
of the living fetus in biomedical research.
It outlined the gUidelines to be used in
therapeutic research on fetuses, pregnant women, fetuses in utero, and in anticipation of abortion, as well as nontherapeutic research directed toward the
nonviable fetus ex utero, the fetus during
an abortion, and the possibly viable infant. A report was issued in August of
1975, "Protection of Human Subjects:
Fetuses, Pregnant Women and In Vitro
Fertilization." FED. REG. 33526. The report attempts to give clear definitions of
every word a subject of the report; addi-

tionally, it discusses the concept of consent to research in great detail. What is
especially interesting is the composition
of the Commission. It is composed of
eleven members: an obstetriciangynecologist, an internist, a pediatrician,
two physiological psychologists, two law
professors, one practicing attorney, two
ethicists (one a Catholic priest), and the
president of a national black women's
organization (a good cross-sectional representation of people well qualified to
consider the subject with one exception:
only one woman).
The fundamental source of our confusion about abortion is the Right to Life
movement. There have always been
Right to Lifers, I expect-Wertheimer's
"conservatives". However, until the
Roe/Doe decisions, no one paid much
attention to them. Richard Steele of
Newsweek calls abortion "1976's
Sleeper Issue". The Right to Lifers even
had their own candidate: an unknown
housewife named Ellen McCormack,
running on an anti-abortion ticket. There
have been over thirty proposed
amendments to the Constitution attempting to make abortion unconstitutional. They are of two types: "states'
rights" amendments, and "affirmative"
or Life-Protective amendments. An "affirmative" amendment would require
recognition of the unborn as individuals;
a "states' rights" amendment would
give the states that option.
Those who argue that a fetus is human
from the moment of conception argue
that the premise on which the Roe/Doe
decisions was decided is faulty; they contend that it is not evident from the Constitution that the word "person"
excludes the unborn. They think that the
burden is on those arguing exclusion,
not on those arguing inclusion. One of
the strongest pro-life arguments is made
by Robert A. Destro: "[If] the 'compelling' point at which the state may exert its
interests in the protection of the lives of
the unborn is placed at viability, that
point moves closer to the time of conception with each development in the
treatment of prenatal and neonatal
problems." The National Right To Life
movement claims more than a million

active members; it is not the only prolife group. They are making themselves
heard; how effective their volume will be
remains to be seen.
An easy solution to the multi-faceted
issue of abortion is not likely, either now
or in the near future. It will take time to
reconcile Jan Leibman, of the National
Organization for Women, when she
says, "No woman should ever be forced
to be her husband's brood mare. The
woman is the one who carries the fetus
and gives birth to it, so she should be the
only one to decide whether to carry it to
term" with Barry Goldwater when he
says, "I don't want to see promiscuous

abortion. If a life is in danger, abortion is
okay, but otherwise the Pill ought to be
enough. If it isn't, they ought to learn to
say no." Wertheimer sums up the argument by saying that each side's positipn
is equally weak and equally strong:
The liberal asks, "What has a zygote
got that is valuable?" and the conservative answers, "Nothing, but it's a
human being, so it's wrong to abort
it." Then the conservatives asks,
"What does a fetus lack that an infant
has that is so valuable?" and the liberal answers, "Nothing, but it's a
fetus, not a human being, so it is all
right to abort it."
And round and round we go.
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